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1.Introduction 
Niklas Luhmann, as already mentioned in the former chapter, started discussing the 
issue of the constitution at a very early stage in his academic career: his first established 
publication in this field was his 1965 work, Fundamental Rights as an Institution, in 
which he already discussed from a standpoint of societal theory, referring to political 
sociology in the subtitle, but which also addressed jurists. This was followed in 1973 by 
his comprehensive approach to the Political Constitution in the Context of the Social 
System, which focused on the question of the constitution’s function for the political 
system, but also still addressed an audience interested in legal theory. Following the 
autopoietic turnaround in the underlying system theory in the eighties, the question 
about the constitution was raised once again in this changed theoretical framework, 
especially in his historically argued 1989 essay The Constitution as an Evolutionary 
Achievement and notably in his 1993 monograph on the functional system Law as a 
Social System. It is therefore possible to speak of an ongoing, though maybe not exactly 
continuous, interest in the topic of the constitution on the part of the sociologist 
Luhmann. This article starts out against a background and on the basis of a preliminary 
inspection of Luhmann’s card index system to ask what traces of the constitutional issue 
can be found in the unique collection of jottings pieced together by Luhmann from the 
fifties onwards and which eventually totalled nearly 90,000 notes by the middle of the 
nineties. 
2. Luhmann’s Card Index System 
In Niklas Luhmann’s description of the theory project he pursued purposefully and 
applied universally for over 35 years, his card index system constitutes a factor that 
cannot be ignored (viz. Luhmann 1981; 1987): without the specific method of the notes 
he already started jotting down even before he started out on his actual academic career, 
the better to provide the results of his excessive and broadly interdisciplinary reading 
with a systematic organisation, as Luhmann tells us himself, the great number and 
thematic diversity of his publications would have been inconceivable. By organising his 
research in this way, he tapped into a system of knowledge management that had 
developed to keep pace with the rapidly increasing number of publications available 
since the sixteenth century (see Zedelmaier 1992, 22ff., 36ff., 99ff.), using a quite 
specific storage and retrieval system to perfect the possibilities of systematic knowledge 
generating offered by the card index system (cf. Krajewski 2002). 
The card index system in Luhmann’s academic estate comprises two largely 
separated collections: (a) an early collection dating to the period 1951-1962, based 
primarily on his readings in the areas of administrative and political sciences, 
organisational theory and philosophy and consisting of some 24,000 notes and (b) a 
later collection dating to the period 1963-1996, featuring a clear sociological slant and 
consisting of some 66,000 notes. As a rule, Luhmann did not put excerpts directly into 
his file system, but was far more likely to take notes while reading, then use them in a 
second stage to generate comments, which he then oriented in particular to relate to the 
other notes already contained in the system. He assumed that it would only be possible 
to decide at a later stage how meaningful a note would be, by seeing how it related to 
other notes. 
Luhmann himself described his filing system on the one hand as a “tool for thinking” 
that provided the groundwork that enabled him to think in a structured, link-oriented 
“manner that works differences in”: this brought all the “ideas” and “chances of (his) 
reading” into his collection, leaving the decision about how to link it all up internally to 
a later stage (ZK II: 9/8g, 9/8a2, 9/8i)1. On the other hand, he said that his filing system 
was a “second memory” that constituted not so much a simple archive of knowledge as 
a partner in a process of communication, so that he himself was surprised by the 
information furnished by the system (Luhmann 1981, 225). The reason why the 
difference of his system of storage and use could be productive was because the 
collection’s internal structure enabled some quite different combinations of several 
notes to be compiled in response to individual questions, making it largely independent 
of the original intention when the note was first drawn up. 
Talking about his filing system, Luhmann (1981, 224f.) based his approach on the 
unusual structure of the note collection, which he maintained explained his unusual 
productivity. In a section devoted to the card index system itself2, he describes the 
collection as “a cybernetic system” in the shape of a “combination of order and 
disorder, of coagulating and unpredictable combinations achieved by accessing it at 
random” (ZK II: 9/8). The precondition for this was that he had to accept the need to do 
without any predetermined order. But even though the note collection has no systematic 
structure, it nevertheless contains an accumulation of many notes about certain terms 
and individual issues. Correspondingly, there is a first level of order and sections that is 
thoroughly differentiated by topics. In the earlier of the two collections, this structure 
still bears clear signs of the (individual) processing of previously determined (and 
external) areas of knowledge, which are listed and processed in 108 sections. The core 
issues in this case are found in the area of legal and political sciences, of the science of 
administration and of organisational theory, but there are also sections on questions 
concerned with epistemology, as well as some individual sociological issues. The 
second and later collection was organised from the very beginning with a focus on 
identified issues and betrays a genuinely sociological grasp. Here there are only eleven 
main topics, while their respective sections contain several thousand cards each: 1 
organisational theory, 2 functionalism, 3 decision theory, 4 officialdom, 5 
formal/informal order, 6 sovereignty/state, 7 individual terms/problems, 8 economics, 9 
random notes, 10 archaic societies, 11 high cultures. It is easy to see that this is neither a 
mere list, nor a structural order with a preconceived system. Instead, this structure is 
very clearly the product of Luhmann’s reading and research interests, as recorded in the 
course of time. This applies both to the first level of ordering and to the additional 
subsections that follow on them, which are at least loosely related to the original issue. 
Within these thematic blocks, each card is then the subject of a specific ordering 
                                                        
1 In this article, references to the notes in the filing system are identified with the numbers given to them 
by Luhmann himself, “ZK I” or “ZK II”, as the two collections are have substantially separate numbering 
and independent of one another.  
2 This may have been drafted in connection with the 1981 article mentioned above. 
principle that does not lead the respective first thematic stipulation to an obligatory 
monothematic succession, but often introduces it to a cascade of issues that take it 
further and further away from the point where the considerations started. As a result, the 
functionalism section, for example, contains not only thoughts about the concept of 
function, but also about that of system, the relationship between systems and the world, 
social theory and stratification, among other things. 
This structure derives from the underlying idea behind Luhmann’s card index 
system, that a card only needs to relate to the previous one and does not necessarily 
need to take a preconceived superior thematic structure into account. This corresponds 
to a specific way of generating notes, in which Luhmann followed up on secondary 
thoughts that triggered his interest, jotting down additional notes about a thought that 
had already occurred to him on a card that he would then place here in the filing system, 
so that he would retain a sequence of cards that led further and further away from the 
original issue or enabled the card index system to grow ‘inwardly’. But placing 
individual cards in the collection was not the only product generated by Luhmann’s 
reading interests in the course of time. The collection itself is also the consequence of 
the frequent difficulty he encountered when he tried to classify a question unequivocally 
under one and only one (superior) issue. Luhmann solved this problem by treating it as 
an opportunity: by adopting the principle that each the entry only has to relate to the 
previous entry, he adhered to the computer technology principle, already known in the 
fifties, of “multiple storage”, so that notes about one issue can be found in quite 
different places in the card index system. 
There is a constitutive relationship between the storage technique thus sketched and 
the special numbering system used for the notes. The principle behind it all derives 
necessarily from the decision to do without an explicit thematic order, which then leads 
to the question of how to retrieve a certain card once it has been filed. The solution is in 
each card’s fixed location and a corresponding numbering system, which at the same 
time tackles the question of how to insert the new card into the existing index without 
causing havoc with the original numbering system. This idea was put into practice with 
a very simple expedient: in each of the major sections listed above, Luhmann first 
always applied a simple numerical sequence that reflected the moment when each entry 
was made. The section number comes before the actual sequential number, so 1/1 is 
followed by 1/2, 1/3 and so on. Cards that were then generated later on and pursue a 
single issue that is jotted down on card 1/1 are then identified by a corresponding 
numerical sequence of their own, so that card 1/1a is inserted between card 1/1 and card 
1/2. The next card after that may return to a single issue with 1b or pursue the previous 
sequence further with 1/1a1: this latter card is inserted between card 1/1a and card 1/1b 
and so on. This procedure means that the space between two thematically related cards 
that were originally generated one directly next to another, so could also be found one 
directly next to the other, may end up being occupied by hundreds of cards generated 
later, whose numerical sequence can have combinations of up to 13 numerals and 
letters. This card index therefore features a thoroughly idiosyncratic 3D structure, which 
Luhmann described in his explanation of his filing system as an “internal branching 
capacity” (1981, 224). 
A further need arises from the storage system sketched out above, and especially its 
principle of multiple storage: all the cards in the collection that are related to one 
another thematically or conceptually must also refer to one another, by means of a 
reciprocal notation of their respective card numbers. For this reason, individual 
references at the beginning of a thematic subsection are often accompanied by an 
introductory card with collective references, which develop systematically on the 
thematically related fields in the card system. Luhmann himself called this reference 
system network a “spider-shaped system” (1987, 143). Test samples enable us to 
assume that there are about 20,000 references in the earlier collection and about 30,000 
in the later one. 
Lastly, in order to ensure that this network of references would always remain 
accessible, Luhmann drew up a list of keywords with about 4,000 entries. This list of 
keywords was the vital tool for using the index, as it was the only way in which notes 
about a given topic could be retrieved with certainty. Unlike a corresponding index in a 
book, this list of keywords lays no claim to achieving a complete compilation of the 
locations in the collection that tackle each concept. Instead, Luhmann generally only 
made of a record of at most three places in his system where the concept in question 
could be found. The underlying idea was that he could then use the internal system of 
cross-references to find the other relevant places very quickly. 
In summary, we can say that not only was Luhmann’s original approach to reading 
and note-taking crucial for his collection to function, but also the relationships between 
the notes that were created on the one hand by his special method of storage and on the 
other by his method of (selective) reference. The difference between the structure of the 
issues put down (more or less at random) in the course of time and the structure of 
references generated with every subsequent new entry thus became sometimes more 
available when the collection was consulted at a later date than had been intended with 
the original note. The collection’s structural organisation ensures that any access to a 
conceptually pertinent place in the collection that is managed via the list of keywords 
does not restrict the search to that single location, quite the contrary: profiting from the 
specific approach adopted for inserting the cards and the structure of references, it 
opens the gates to a web of notes, so that the combination of the search question 
addressed to the list of keywords and the principle of placing the cards and the reference 
system systematically brings (theoretically or conceptually controlled) chance into play. 
With his principle of multiple storage and a method of references reminiscent of today’s 
hyperlinks – and despite using an analogue storage system, Luhmann was already 
simulating a modern computer-aided databank system as early as the 1960s, to which he 
then resorted with increasing frequency for the purpose of generating his manuscripts, 
once he had achieved a critical mass of notes at the beginning of the seventies. This by 
no means indicates that the relationship between the card index and Luhmann’s 
publications was in any way one-sided, far from it: the basic assumption should be one 
of reciprocity, in which on the one hand the texts were initiated by consulting the card 
index and by asking it specific questions, so as generate a combination of a variety of 
findings from different places, while on the other hand the thoughts thus generated also 
found their way back into the card index in their own right (see Schmidt 2012, 10f). 
Similarly, not (only) was verified knowledge entrusted to the collection’s function as a 
tool for thinking, but a process of theory generation was also recorded, including 
potential mistakes and red herrings, which were revised by later entries, but not 
eliminated, as once a card had found its way into the index, it stayed there. 
After this introduction, it is now time to ask what traces the constitutional issue left 
in the card index and whether the system’s functionality as described above is 
confirmed for this topic. 
 
3. The Constitution in the Card Index System 
The fact that Luhmann focused intensively on law as a subject matter throughout his 
entire academic career can of course be traced back to the circumstance that, as a jurist 
who first took an interest in constitutional law, he also had a special affinity for this 
field later in his career, as a sociologist. To this extent it comes as no surprise that his 
card index system contains a large number of notes about the law. To be sure, it should 
be noted from the start that this only applies to a limited extent for the issue of special 
interest to us here now: that of the constitution. 
3.1 Card Index I: the Concept of Constitutional Law  
From 1956 to 1962, Luhmann worked as an advisor in the Lower Saxony Ministry of 
Culture, although at the same time he was already pursuing advanced academic 
interests, with a special focus firstly on constitutional law and administrative studies, 
which already at this time led not only to extensive reading, but also to his first more 
comprehensive manuscripts. Thus does his estate include not only the manuscript of a 
practically complete, but never submitted, dissertation about The Organisation of 
Government Advisory Bodies, dated 1955, in which he discusses the question of 
submitting advisory relations to a process of normation under (organisational) law, but 
also further, albeit incomplete, manuscripts about political science and about a theory of 
the contemporary state dated to the late fifties.  
This primary perspective of political and administrative sciences, on which Luhmann 
was only to expand by taking an increasing and decided interest in organisational 
studies from the beginning of the sixties,3 already becomes clear in the structure he gave 
to the collection, which, compared to the second card index, still shows the signs of the 
(individual) processing of previously largely determined and relatively 
compartmentalised areas of knowledge: in particular in the earlier part of the collection, 
the majority of these still reflect a juridical approach.4 Yet the fact that Luhmann’s 
relationship to sociology is still rather distant here is not clear from the thematic 
priorities. Rather, the collection contains repeated formulations that demonstrate the 
jurist’s lingering mistrust of what, from his point of view, was the conceptually less 
disciplined discussion about sociology. In a similar vein, the few references to the 
constitution are primarily expressed from an internal legal viewpoint. They can be 
found in the section on the constitution, section 27, which comes between section 26, 
“Power”, and section 28 on “The Nature of Organisation”. When it comes, though, the 
topic’s explicit treatment is certainly very clear: on no more than 13 cards (making this 
                                                        
3  It was also at this time that Luhmann spent a sabbatical at the Harvard University School of 
Government, where he first came into contact with Talcott Parsons: this led to Luhmann to apply himself 
more vigorously to sociology. 
4 Such as the issues of the state, equality, planning, the right of veto, power, the constitution, emergency, 
government and the majority principle. Subsequently, the topics (among others the division of labour, 
hierarchy, roles and integration) then enable a gradual orientation towards organisational studies – and 
thus also as a consequence to sociology – to be detected. 
one of the shortest sections in the collection), Luhmann approaches the topic from a 
decidedly constitutional angle. 
Already the literature that Luhmann noted at the beginning of the section derives 
practically exclusively from the juridical discussion (of political and administrative 
science and public law): in the notes that followed, he had evidently taken his cue in 
particular from Hermann Heller’s 1934 political science. In addition to a majority of 
legal literature, he also took note of several works of legal history and just one 
sociological text, Helmut Schelsky’s 1949 essay On the Stability of Institutions, 
Especially Constitutions. However there are no traces in the notes that follow of any 
reading of this text, which focuses primarily on discussing from a standpoint of cultural 
anthropology and institutions theory. 
A short definition provides the introduction: the concept of the constitution is not 
“phenomenologically traceable sociological circumstance”, but a legal concept 
generated with certain historical and political intentions, whose meaning resides in 
“being a self-made, supreme basic law that can be shaped, reshaped and amended to suit 
its purpose”. That is why its typical form is the written constitution, whose ultimate 
legitimation is the “free will of the people” (ZK I: 27,1). The constitution is treated – in 
a still very old-European vein of legal theory – as an attempt on the part of “Western 
man […] to take possession of the state”: it is part of the “essence of the state […] to be 
available and that means that it has a constitution”. In the process, Luhmann observes 
that “this is not all explained by the sociological situation of the emerging citizenry that 
seeks its system of government” (27,2). As a consequence of the basic order guaranteed 
by the constitution becoming available, there is the rise of a need for the constitution to 
be safeguarded against amendments. This leads to a.) the problem of how to protect the 
constitution and b.) the question of putting barriers in the way of amending or altering 
the constitution (27,2). However both of these points are only followed by a few 
references to the literature but no further discussion of contents. 
For modern constitutional thinking, as Luhmann then continues, it is of decisive 
significance to the constitution not only that it is a manufactured fact, but also that it is 
homogeneous, meaning that it has 1.) an external homogeneity, since it is set out in a 
single written document, and 2.) an internal, material homogeneity, since it is the result 
of a closed, systematic plan (27, 4). In this vein, it is not the material content of the 
codification in itself that is characteristic of a modern constitution, so much as how it is 
systemised and rationalised. It is a necessary precondition for this that the state has a 
monopoly of law-making. In this context, Luhmann issues a demand (but takes it no 
further) for a theory of constitutional law-making to tackle the issue of a pre-
constitutional subject, since the loss of belief in the divine establishment of the overall 
political order is of underlying significance for the modern constitution. 
In conclusion, a short reference to Hans Freyer’s 1925 work Der Staat (The State, 
although it is not quoted in the original, only as a secondary source) then accompanies a 
short comment on the paradoxical material content that the constitution is a “system of 
axioms that stands unproven and unprovable at the beginning, but for its part lends their 
truth in the system to all true sentences” (27,6). This perception of the constitution’s 
unjustifiable self-justification was later to be crucial to Luhmann’s later understanding 
in the eighties, although nothing more is added to it in the earlier collection, as the 
section is simply discontinued here. 
In the late fifties and early sixties, then, Luhmann took note of this issue, primarily in 
the framework of the established constitutional viewpoint, but no more than that: 
compared to other issues found in the first card index, this one is treated as marginal and 
no interpretation of his own is yet recognisable, to say nothing of a sociological one. 
Then there is the fact that there are absolutely no references to be found in this section 
that would lead to networking with other fields in the card index. In addition to this 
section, the only other reference in the list of keywords is one at point 10 “Organisation 
as Imagination and Reality”, where there is just a note mentioning that the written 
constitution can be construed as a bridge between ideological state doctrine and reality. 
Since an examination of other, potentially more pertinent sections, such as on the 
Concept of State (ZK I: 9), on the Relationship between Organisation (State) and the 
Law (12) and on Politics and Law (14,6) has also turned up no additional findings, the 
first card index displays extensive ignorance of the constitutional issue, despite its focus 
on legal science. 
3.2 Card Index II: A Social Theory Appreciation of the Constitution  
This tends to change in the second (sociological) card index collection, which 
Luhmann started at the beginning of the sixties. Nevertheless, it must be said that the 
number of notes relative to constitutions that Luhmann generated in this collection, now 
with a primary focus on considerations of social theory, is comparably negligible here, 
too. 
This applies in particular in the light of the fact that this collection contains an 
extensive block denominated 3414 “Legal Order”, with some 2,500 cards, following the 
areas of “Ideology”, “Authority” and “Rules” in section 3 on “Decision Theory”. In this 
block, a large number of more comprehensive sub-topics can be identified, which cover 
Luhmann’s known concepts of the sociology of law and legal theory and follow one 
another more or less non-systematically, corresponding to the principle of information 
storage sketched out above: the function of the law, the concept of justice, the question 
of the generalisation of expected behaviour, the relationship between the sociology of 
law and legal theory, the positivisation of the law, basic rights, legal decision theory 
(conditional programming, legal doctrine, subjective rights), the differentiation of the 
legal system, the limits of enforceability of the law, justice/injustice, the legal system as 
a closed self-referential system. The names of these sub-topics already hint at 
Luhmann’s various related publications. Although the block contains both earlier and 
later entries, there is a clearly identifiable focus datable to the seventies. 
3.2.1 The Constitution as a Legal Institution 
The legal section of the card index contains decidedly scanty notes about the 
constitution: 
(1) There is nothing substantial among the approximately 200 cards that make up the 
sub-topic 3414/6 “The Positivisation of the Law”, except a few short comments about 
the possibility that positive law may stipulate the irreversibility of the law under the 
heading of “constitutional amendments” (ZK II: 3414/6c6): here Luhmann makes a 
concrete reference to the relevant articles of several European countries’ constitutions 
and then emphasises that the problem was originally not so much one of the possibility 
as far more of the impossibility of amending the constitution, because it is enacted as a 
positive law and is supposed to apply as such (3414/6c6a). 
(2) The most extensive notes can be found in the approximately 100 cards that make 
up the section 3414/10 “Basic Rights”. However just as in Luhmann’s 1965 book on 
Basic Rights, whose preparation probably furnished the context for the majority of these 
notes, this section contains hardly any systematic considerations about the concept of 
the constitution itself. Again, just as in the book, which starts by mentioning only the 
difference between segments of constitutions that deal with basic rights and with 
organisation, as well as the question of their rationale in natural law, while focusing no 
particular attention on the concept of the constitution itself5, against the background of 
the thesis of the (latent) function of preserving a differentiated social order, the section 
ventures immediately (ZK II: 34141/10a) into a discussion of a variety of basic rights: 
rights of freedom, rights of franchise, rights of property, rights of association, freedom 
of opinion, freedom of conscience, equality and freedom of religion. These are then 
followed by just two very short general comments about the constitution: 
(a) Basic rights have the function not only of preserving a differentiated social order 
as a whole, but also of organising how the state reaches its decisions, since they 
organise their environment in such a way as to enable a political system to be 
differentiated. When basic rights are anchored in the constitution, this enables the 
state’s decision-making system to concentrate on a specific function (3414/10f). 
(b) At the same time, in the interests of encountering a differentiated social order in 
the form of basic rights, technology relieves the constitution of over-high 
interdependences: as a result, legal questions are differentiated by sector, even when a 
majority of basic rights may be affected “in isolated cases” (3414/10f2). 
(3) Finally, section 3414/13 “Law and Power” contains an even more marginal 
observation: instead of assuming that the law is the code of political power, Luhmann 
finds it more sensible to ask what it means when the code of a medium – in this case 
political power – is placed contingently following on social development. According to 
his reading, only the law can be considered for controlling the contingency of the code 
of political power. This obliges on the one hand constitutions to be juridified and on the 
other the law to be positivised (3414/13f1). 
In the last notes mentioned, it is striking that Luhmann here already abandoned the 
perspective originally focused on the law and adopted the dual perspective of law and 
politics that was to be a constituent factor of his later approach (see below). 
Looking through the remaining notes about the law in the second collection in search 
of further supposedly pertinent places – for example in the sections on natural law 
(3414/3b), on the legal order and hierarchy (3414/9), on the sources of the law 
(3414/12) and on the differentiation of the law (3414/14), including its sub-topic on the 
legal system and political system (3414/14k10), on the law as a self-substituting order 
(3414/32), on the applicability of the law (3414/38b) or on the basic principles of the 
law (3414/48) – there are no entries of any kind that refer to the constitution. 
                                                        
5 This can be explained by the fact that this feeds directly into the constitutional discussion – so the 
concept of the constitution is ultimately consolidated – from whose interpretation of basic rights 
Luhmann then dissociates himself, however, with his functional questioning. The social theory grounding 
for the concept of the constitution that is still largely missing here then followed in the 1973 essay 
mentioned above. 
Consulting the list of keywords, it soon becomes clear that Luhmann did not place 
the issue of the constitution in the block of notes about the law in the second card index, 
but in two places with notes about politics, in the sections 35 “The Organisation of 
Decisions” and 7/54 “The Welfare State”. This thematic classification under politics can 
be explained by looking at the history of his works and is ultimately already applied in 
his book on basic rights, whose notes Luhmann nevertheless had still filed under the 
law (see above): the notes mentioned were probably first generated in the context of his 
1973 essay on the constitution, which targeted an audience of legal theorists, although it 
focused on the function for politics; the second section is related to his 1981 book on 
the theory of the welfare state. 
3.2.2 The Constitution between Politics and the Law 
Starting from the filing number 35/5g5, there are some 40 cards that tackle this issue 
in the sub-topic 35/5 “Administration as a System of Decision-making”, which can be 
found among the 700 cards that make up the large section 35 “The Organisation of 
Decisions”, most of them dating to the seventies, the rest to the eighties. In this case, the 
focus or system reference is primarily on politics, something that is not necessarily 
surprising, in the light of the sequence in this section about decision-making, before 
then changing over from a political to a legal perspective, although without making any 
great fuss about it.6 As a general rule, these notes tend to be fundamental and sometimes 
programmatic in character, i.e. they seldom go into detail and are scarcely co-ordinated 
in terms of theory, which indicates that they were jotted down over a considerable 
period of time. 7  Similarly, it is possible to identify several different approaches to 
determining functions and some only loosely related structural descriptions: 
3.2.2.1 Limiting and Increasing Political Power 
This starts by defining the modern state as a decision-making organisation that, 
unlike the res publica, is no longer perceived as a continuation of an inherited order, but 
is legitimised rationally by a political formula made to measure especially for the 
purpose. Establishing that the decision is binding in nature and so legitimising it is the 
task of the constitution (ZK II: 35/5ga), while it is essential for a modern understanding 
of the constitution that there can only be one constitutional law (35/5g5a13), as this is 
the only way that the connection to the social function of politics is guaranteed after the 
unifying concept of civil society, i.e. of an ethically and politically constituted society, 
has dissolved (35/5ga1). In this connection we find a first, still very general definition 
of the concept: “The constitution can be described as those structures in a system that 
are institutionalised multifunctionally and so cannot be separated from the point of view 
of a specific function. Any change in them makes it necessary to stabilise the entire 
system all over again and is correspondingly difficult” (35/5ga1). To be sure, Luhmann 
later added a question mark to this passage and noted only a little later that, in addition 
to this aspect of multifunctionality, which does not exclude enough, it was also 
                                                        
6  It is worth recalling the fact mentioned above that a card’s location in the index was ultimately 
determined by the principle of how it would relate to the previous card, not by how it would relate to the 
overall topic. 
7 Further indicators in favour of this theory are the changing handwriting and the different types of paper 
used for the cards. 
necessary to consider the question of especially focal or essential connections that are 
placated by constitutions. With this in mind, he continued by noting two proposals: 
(a) Constitutions are written for the purpose of limiting political power. This thesis is 
offered in the context of cybernetic thinking, typical of the perspectives of the seventies, 
about how an increase in power becomes possible as a result of a decrease in power 
(35/5g5a3): while the old European model set out to draw distinctions between the 
rulers and the ruled, the modern model of power construes the constitution as a structure 
that enables power to increase as a result of restricting, so there is a need to draw 
distinctions between an internal limitation of political power in the form of checks and 
balances in the organisational part of the constitution and an external limitation 
achieved by natural laws, underlying values or basic rights (35/5g5a2-3). Luhmann thus 
considers the constitutional model’s most important function to be to ensure that the 
limitations of power do not detract from the power itself. As the barriers to the power 
are not restricted to its ability to enforce, it is only possible to set conditions to 
relationships of power if they can then in turn become the object of politics (35/5g5a4). 
This is no longer just a question of applying the law to the state, but of the state 
regulating the conditions governing the guarantee of the law. Similarly, 
constitutionalism uses the constitution as a central tool of transformation (35/5g5a7), 
without there being any scope for still talking about using political means to achieve an 
intentional change of society: instead, we should assume that social development 
displays the form of evolution (35/5g5a10).  
(b) For Luhmann, constitutions’ second function is to reformulate the conditions of 
social compatibility for the political subsystem (35/5g5d), against the background of the 
general assumption that the constitution governs the relations between the system and 
its environment (35/5g5b). this function is linked to the observation that the planes of 
interaction, organisation and society that constitute society are pulling away from one 
another with increasing centrifugal force.8 These social preconditions can no longer be 
taken for granted in a sovereign state, nor are they moralised any more, i.e. transferred 
from the model of interaction to the life of the state, but have to be reformulated. 
3.2.2.2 The Constitution as the Deparadoxisation of the Law  
Alongside these notes, which are typical of Luhmann’s approach to the dual 
perspective of politics and law, are others that concern themselves with the 
constitution’s idiosyncrasies as a self-referential law to govern the law, prompting 
questions of law’s self-imposed asymmetry and also including some historical 
observations.  
The thesis that the constitution is construed as an installation in the system of a 
description of the system explains the high share of concepts of difference in 
constitutional semantics, both from a system-environment perspective (basic rights) and 
through an internal differentiation (the separation of powers) (ZK II: 35/5g5a9). 
It is in this area that we find comments on the constitution’s paradoxes. For example, 
that the problem was already diagnosed in the seventeenth century that no law can 
establish its own immutability, since it actually cannot exclude the possibility that the 
                                                        
8 The thesis of an increasing difference between the planes of interaction, organisation and society is 
developed further at note ZK II: 21/3d27f. 
very clause that establishes immutability will itself be amended one day (35/5g5a11); 
similarly, the order of succession was still a crucial component of the pre-revolutionary 
understanding of the constitution (35/5g5a11g). Since more recent constitutional 
thinking no longer relies on a cosmologically inspired hierarchy of laws, it is confronted 
with the realisation that positive law requires immutability and hierarchies to be 
established (35/5g5a12). 
Similarly, the need for constitutions is ascribed to positive law’s idiosyncrasy of 
being circular in composition and having a tautological description (35/5g5k+k1-3): 
constitutions serve the purpose of breaking this circle by establishing hierarchies in the 
sources of the law and so concealing the fact that the law itself is the sole source of the 
law. Only in the legal system itself can and must a constitution be treated as a natural 
exigency. This brings Luhmann to a concept of the constitution that is based on a 
strictly functional definition with regard to a problem that first arose in history from the 
differentiation of the legal system in the course of the differentiation of society. This 
leads to a series of research questions, which Luhmann noted down here, although 
without following them up in his card index: (a) he believed it was no coincidence that 
that the constitutional movement coincided with the demise of the case for natural law; 
(b) according to his approach, constitutional problems in developing countries can be 
attributed to the fact that no premises had been created there for the problem that the 
constitutions set out to solve, i.e. the self-referentially closed nature of the various social 
subsystems arrived at by means of differentiation, so that the observable semantic 
borrowings from Europe could promise little in the way of success;9 (c) the ‘beauty 
spots’ that can be discerned in all constitutions in the form of unsupressible self-
references called Luhmann’s attention to the fact that all methods used to erase 
tautologies must proceed impurely, e.g. by anchoring corresponding plausibilities in the 
canon of basic values,10 by delegating to organisation in the process of the separation of 
powers,11 by a specifically juridical perception of the constitution as a natural exigency 
and by borrowing from logical analyses that demonstrate that it is impossible to achieve 
a logical conclusion 12 or by accepting a limited extent of self-reference at a higher 
level.13 It is notable here that none of the points mentioned results in a reference to other 
sections in the card index that might be pertinent in this respect: in each case, the only 
reference is outside the card index to other literature. 
3.2.2.3 The Constitutional State and the Welfare State 
The second more extensive heading mentioned in the list of keywords, to which 
reference is also made in the section just described, is also located in the area of 
political theory. Of the approximately 150 cards that make up the section 7/54 on the 
“Welfare State”, 20 come under the sub-topic 7/54b of “The Welfare 
State/Constitutional State”. 
                                                        
9 This topic was discussed by Marcelo Neves in his dissertation Constitution and the Positivity of the Law 
in Peripheral Modern Societies, whose manuscript is also mentioned here by Luhmann. 
10 Without Luhmann referring here to the relevant sections in his card index. 
11 Luhmann mentions Hermann Heller by name, but without naming the relevant location in his system in 
card index ZK I. 
12 Luhmann here merely makes fleeting mention of “Gödel and successors”. 
13 This card contains a literature reference to Lars Löfgren, but without any subsequent reference to 
sections relevant to self-reference (ZK II: 21/3d26g98) or to paradox (21/3d26g70m). 
In the context of the thesis of politics overstretching itself that we know from his 
1981 book Political Theory in the Welfare State, Luhmann starts by using the feedback 
concept to compare the welfare state and the constitutional state (ZK II: 7/54b1-9). The 
welfare state relies on the principles of a positive feedback: any deviation from the 
condition as given is favoured, after which information is sought. The theories of the 
constitutional state, on the other hand, aim primarily to counter the abuse of power and 
are therefore formulated in terms of a negative feedback: they aim are acquiring 
information that indicates deviations from the morally and legally required condition, so 
that mechanisms can be introduced to recuperate the status quo. In a constitutional state 
with this kind of conception, Luhmann focuses primarily on two viewpoints, but 
without going into any greater detail: 1) sovereignty, in the sense that it is impossible to 
enforce a binding decision to solve every conflict, and 2) precautionary measures 
against the abuse of power. 
Luhmann then considers the constitutional state’s historical development into the 
(constitutionally based) welfare state as an example of how social evolution takes place 
on the plane of functional systems (7/54b5): although the constitutional state was 
stabilised by the law and so by a negative feedback, so could wait for conflicts, it 
introduced an evolutionary non-identical reproduction that can then be perceived to be 
the welfare state. Admittedly, the reference found here to a corresponding location in 
the more extensive section of the card index that deals with evolution (ZK II: 54/14kg) 
leads largely into the wilderness: there is only a short note commenting that when 
evolution is described in this case as non-identical reproduction, it means that all 
political decisions always contain a reference to the structure, especially to the state 
constitution, and that processes of variation and selection could come about here 
(54/14kgC1).14 
Finally, in one note that was inserted at a very late stage and stands isolated in the 
section, Luhmann points out that the relationship between the constitutional state and 
the welfare state can be understood as the transformation of the basic paradox of a 
system’s identity and its description of itself (ZK II: 7/54b10 f): in the constitutional 
state, there is a difference between the body of constitutional norms and the problem of 
the re-entry of the difference between the state and society in that state. In the welfare 
state, there is a comparable difference between superficial structures and deeper 
structures: the surface structure is described as a phenomenon of escalation (more social 
activities and commitments, more impact on society, more financial burdens, more 
juridification, more bureaucracy etc.). As a result, it is programmed into the crisis of the 
state, as no escalation is in fact possible. The basic paradox is then in the consequence 
that the political system is thus occupied with more and more problems that it actually 
created for itself, so needs new forms of re-entry rationality. In this respect, Luhmann 
mentions the social diagnostic suspicion that the welfare state therefore has “the more 
contemporary problems”, so that the constitutional state loses out on thematic relevance 
and is not tackled (ZK II: 7/54b4). 
Any search in the remaining political sections of the second card index for any 
additional notes comes up with thoroughly negative results: in the place actually 
reserved for this in the card index, section 533/15 on “Politics”, where the majority of 
                                                        
14 Luhmann then developed this point further in the nineties, when he wrote his monograph on politics as 
a functional system (2000, 422f). 
the approximately 800 cards decidedly dedicated to political theory are collected as a 
sub-heading of the section 533 on “Peer Groups, Problems of Consensus and Consensus 
Formalisations”, most of which date to the seventies and eighties, there is no 
observations of any kind. And that despite the fact that Luhmann discusses the 
“Relationship to Other Subsystems” there in a separate section 533/15t, in the process 
quoting economics, science, religion, the educational system and the family and 
tackling them under individual, sometimes quite extensive sub-headings. In vain does 
one search for notes on the law, however. In this respect, there is nothing more than a 
reference in an introductory overview of the various different constellations of systems 
to publications on basic rights – here, too, then, to material outside the collection, but 
not to the relevant section described above – as well as to the location 3414/14k10 
already mentioned above, with a glimpse at the constitution, although it is not exactly 
pertinent. 
Likewise, there are no findings in the older, primary notes contained in the section 
353 on “Power and Influence” dating back to the sixties and seventies, on which 
Luhmann presumably drew when preparing his 1975 book on power. The same also 
applies for the fourth place in the system with a decided affinity to politics, which is 
located in the block 6 “Sovereignty and the State”, drawn up in the seventies and 
eighties and comprising approximately 150 cards, although an introductory mention is 
made here of the legal side of the sovereignty paradox in the form of freedom and 
obligation (ZK II: 6/1,3 f) and of the reflexivity of applicable law (6/1e). However there 
are no references that develop any further on the theme of the role played by the 
constitution in this process of the differentiation of the political system, which Luhmann 
describes from a historical perspective, save one short note that the theory of the 
constitutional state15 as a theory of reflection provides an answer to the question of 
whether all conflicts can be solved politically and discusses the nature of the non-
arbitrary use of political force (6/1l)16. The same also applies in the case of the extensive 
section on the concept of the state (6/3). 
To make a provisional appraisal, it has to be said that also the second card index only 
tackles the issue of the constitution rather marginally: most of the notes in the pertinent 
sections are no more than rapid sketches, while the presence of argumentatively more 
comprehensive considerations arrayed in sequence is rather sparse. The cohesion of the 
theses mentioned is mostly poor, just as the notes are evidently altogether a 
documentary record of a rather long period of time and a correspondingly unsystematic 
search process, in which nothing seems to have been attached purposefully to any 
particular location in the card index system. Instead, the majority of Luhmann’s actual 
theoretical and conceptual work took place outside the card index, with a first focus 
especially in his 1965 book on basic rights, whose main emphasis is nevertheless still 
on the controversy with political science and legal theory. Also in the case of his 1975 
essay on Political Constitutions in the Context of the System of Society, which spelled 
out the general thesis that the constitution plays a regulatory role for the political 
system’s relationship with its environment and which goes much further than the 
available notes, Luhmann seems to have made practically no use of his card index or at 
the most used his notes as no more than sources of keywords. Lastly, something similar 
applies to his 1981 publication about the welfare state. Since the notes in the collection 
                                                        
15 A reference is also made to this location from the section 7/54 mentioned above. 
16 The reference found here to the location 533/15z/e on “Political Theory” goes no further here. 
are rather rudimentary in character, it is also impossible to use the formulation that was 
so popular with Luhmann with reference to his publications, i.e. that the card index even 
exceeded his output of learned texts. On the contrary, only a few of the discussions 
crucial to these publications found their way into the card index, so that in this 
particular case not only is the linkage between the card index and the book at best a 
loose one, but in addition it can be stated that Luhmann mostly refrained from 
transferring the considerations he had developed in the process of developing his 
manuscript into the card index, unlike what he often did when producing other 
manuscripts, since he intended to develop their themes further. 
A quest for the reasons for this finding leads in particular to two reciprocally related 
causes. On the one hand, the constitution probably achieves such scanty consideration 
in the card index because the issue was both an early and a late developer in Luhmann: 
he had already tackled the issue comprehensively at a very early stage with his 1965 
book on basic rights and his 1973 essay on the constitution, without having been able to 
fall back on any substantial numbers of existing notes in his card index at that stage. 
Correspondingly, all we find in the card index are the outlines he had prepared in the 
framework of the practical preparatory work for these publications, whereas the 
majority of the work he put into developing the arguments for this purpose took place 
outside the card index, directly during the preparation of the manuscripts. On the other 
hand, despite his enduring interest in the law, much of Luhmann’s attention was 
evidently drawn to other fields by the work he started doing on his other publications in 
the mid-seventies, so that there were at first very few concrete opportunities for any 
further notes.17 In addition, as already mentioned before, the comparatively few outlines 
are scattered across several different places in the card index. This feature of how the 
card index is composed on the basis of the principle of multiple storage reflects the 
circumstance that Luhmann went against the grain of the constitutional presumption of 
a fusion between politics and the law, proceeding from an operative difference between 
the two and so from a dual perspective also of the constitution. Nevertheless, in the 
sketches dating to the seventies, this dual perspective leads to notes that are mostly 
unconnected to their neighbours, some of them adopting the political standpoint, others 
the legal or constitutional perspective.18 Paradoxically, it was only when he transposed 
the general theory of social systems onto the model of operational closure that the 
possibility of a new theoretical conception was revealed, one that was capable of taking 
both perspectives into consideration at the same time. Yet this late development was 
based primarily on the essentials, so that its development in terms of material records on 
the issue of the constitution could not really draw on the card index. 
3.2.2.4 The Constitution as A Structural Bond between Politics and Law 
After a certain period of respite, the problem of the theoretically conclusive 
treatment of inter-system phenomena concomitant with the concept of autopoiesis 
(Luhmann 1982) led Luhmann at the end of the eighties to introduce the general 
theoretical concept of structural coupling, which enables the reciprocal irritation in 
                                                        
17 In this respect, it is worth mentioning that Luhmann’s book on basic rights was edited repeatedly 
without amendment once every decade, which can be read as evidence that the author felt that the 
publication had not been superseded. 
18 In his book on basic rights, on the other hand, Luhmann construes the benchmark issue to which basic 
rights react as regarding society as a whole: the conservation of a functionally differentiated society. 
closed systems to be modelled. 19  In the context of this development, he then also 
achieved a theoretical reformulation of the concept of the constitution, which is 
construed as a structure in the social subsystems of law and politics that operate not 
only separately from one another, yet refer reciprocally to each other, but in addition as 
a mechanism that at the same time ensures a close correlation between the two 
functional areas. 
The relationship implicit in this between politics and the law was first subjected to 
preliminary development at the end of the eighties in the corresponding concept of the 
state based on the rule of law, which in its turn was derived from a reading of the state 
as the political system describing itself. The development of this theory is recorded in 
parts of the approximately 80 cards about the state based on the rule of law that date 
back to the seventies and eighties and can be found in the second collection under 
35/5j6, in the same main section 35 “The Organisation of Decisions” as the subsection 
on the constitution, although there is no direct reference to this section, despite a 
corresponding note to that effect20. The concept of the state based on the rule of law 
hinging on the reciprocal relationship between the law and politics that was adopted by 
Luhmann from the very beginning (1971), and espoused against the political science 
that held sway in the sixties and seventies, eventually blossomed into the thesis that the 
state based on the rule of law itself constitutes the borderline between the law and 
politics, where both sides only ever see their own potential, just as in a mirror. This 
concept then manifested itself again in the essay published in 1988, The Two Sides of 
the State Based on the Rule of Law: this essay’s development either drew on some of 
the notes contained in the section mentioned above or was the occasion for others to be 
added. 
The corresponding constitutional concept reacts to the diagnosed need for the 
completely separated system to be connected, as Luhmann notes in his essay The 
Constitution as an Evolutionary Achievement (1990, 180; 193). The thesis of the 
constitution achieving the structural coupling between politics and the law was 
eventually lexicalised in Luhmann’s monograph on the legal system (1993, 440ff), 
although in the card index the constitution is merely noted as a candidate for this 
theoretical figure: as already mentioned previously, the sub-heading on differentiation 
from the legal system contains a small sequence of cards on the legal system and 
politics (ZK II: 3414/14k10 ff) which, while it does refer to the above-mentioned 
section 35/5j6 on the state based on the rule of law, does not refer to the constitution, 
but merely makes a brief statement to the effect that the relationship between the law 
and politics can be formulated anew on this basis. The corresponding place in the 
system for the theoretical concept of structural coupling can be found in the larger block 
about the concept of function (ZK II: 21/8v). Arranged at the end of the eighties, the 35 
cards that make up this subsection are not particularly comprehensive, nevertheless they 
                                                        
19 The concept of structural coupling was first introduced in a 1989 manuscript about the relationship 
between the law and the economy, which was then reflected in the relevant section in Luhmann’s 
monograph on the functional system of the law (1993, 452ff). 
20 “The state based on the rule of law is the notion that the political system determines its essence as a 
‘state’ in accordance with the constitution, i.e. in a nutshell, the law is established and determined by the 
law. The state is defined in its particular form by the constitution, i.e. by a law. This is underscored 
emphatically as the victory of the law over the power, so over politics; and, thus, of reason over 
arbitrariness. All power must therefore take the form of competences.” (ZK II: 35/5j6i) 
include not only primarily conceptual and terminological clarifications, but also 
evidence of their application. Along with others, the constitution is mentioned twice as 
this kind of mechanism of structural coupling (21/8v2 & v12): as in other cases specific 
to functional systems, however, this thesis is merely hinted at in the card index, while 
the actual developments on the theme are reserved for the author’s corresponding 
publications. 
With reference to the works he published in the field of the law from the mid-
eighties onwards, it has to be said that Luhmann evidently decided to do largely without 
providing his card index with a documentary record of the latest theoretical 
developments. The reason why this is worth mentioning is because he continued to 
generate more extensive notes for other topics right up to the nineties, among others for 
his 1991 book on risks (ZK II: 21/3d18c60o9 ff) and the 1995 volume on art (ZK II: 
32/3g13k ff and 11/13 ff). Yet this does not apply to the topic of the law in general, nor 
in particular to Luhmann’s 1993 monograph on the legal system. So it follows that the 
conceptual stipulations that were only first developed in this framework were no longer 
worked systematically into the card index. Similarly, the essay about the constitution 
published in 1990, with its wealth of material content, also has no immediately 
discernible corresponding section in the card index.21 Luhmann appears to have found it 
much easier to develop his text conventionally in the case of law than in other cases, 
where he first had to work on the topic’s material content himself,22 with the result that 
this, too, led to no further new entries. Correspondingly, the card index also only 
contains relatively few notes that were first generated in the framework of the 
preparation for the monograph Law, Justice, Society. 23  Section 3414/18, which is 
supposedly pertinent, since it bears the same title, comprises precisely one card, 
although this on card dates not from the end of the eighties, but from the beginning of 
the seventies, reacting to the evidence of a crisis in the law – in the sense of a crisis in 
legal consciousness – and containing a reference to the approximately 150 cards that 
make up another, older block, 3414/14 on “Law in a Differentiated Social Order”, that 
first of all links to Durkheim and his theory of using the law to integrate a differentiated 
social order, then adds observations about contemporary legal development and the 
differentiation of the law, yet contains only selectively newly-inserted cards (as in the 
case of section 3414/6 on the positivisation of the law). Meanwhile, the section 3414/38 
on “Law as a Self-Referential Closed System” was drawn up in the framework of 
Luhmann’s later socio-legal thinking. Admittedly, it contains only about 40 cards, but 
they include his well-known observations about the concept of law’s operational 
closure, validity, codification and the jurisprudence of interests, which he had 
developed and extended on in essays published in the journal Rechtstheorie in the 
eighties and while preparing the ground for the 1993 monograph on the Legal System, 
although none of this generated any feedback worth mentioning in the card index. The 
fact that the section that covers the concept of validity contains a reference of content 
                                                        
21 Unlike the short, rather sketched 1988 essay The Two Sides of the State Based on the Rule of Law. 
22  The legal scholar’s ‘insider perspective’ leads correspondingly to clearly higher expectations of 
reception from sociologists, which can easily be discerned in the relevant 1972 publication (of particular 
note alongside the book on basic rights is the manuscript on contingency and law that has since been 
published (2013)), which was produced in parallel to and as an extension of his A Sociological Theory of 
Law (1972). 
23 Which incidentally also devotes comparatively little space to the issue of the constitution (see in 
particular 1993, 470ff). 
(to 3414/38b1) “elaborated in Law, Justice, Society (Ms 89)” indicates that the card 
index was no longer Luhmann’s primary dialogue partner at this stage, just as, vice-
versa, it had not yet been at the earlier time when he drew up his book on basic rights. 
4. Conclusion 
To summarise, it must therefore be stated that the card index was no particularly 
original dialogue partner for Luhmann when it came to his work in the area of the 
constitution. Since Luhmann’s interest in the topic of the constitution was first reflected 
in early corresponding publications, as time went on this led to very few follow-up 
entries in the card index, so that it is possible to observe a phenomenon, with regard to 
these notes, that Luhmann described in his own appraisal of the card index as a process 
of trickling and of patchy growth (1981, 225): although the sections with notes about 
the law and politics grew continuously in the seventies and eighties, the process was 
neither even nor applied across the entire scope of the theme. Similarly, Luhmann’s late 
development of his newer, decidedly bifocal understanding of the constitution could not 
link up to any already existing larger body of notes. As it was probably predictable for 
Luhmann at the end of the eighties that these were likely to be his last publications 
about the law, so that in that sense there was no longer any need for the collection to be 
tailored to keep up what was in practice an intrinsically future-oriented attitude, he was 
gradually converted to producing his texts more conventionally when his card index still 
featured no corresponding contents, as a result of which he also did without any 
feedback into it.24 
The small number of cards about the issue of the constitution is closely related – and 
this is far more important for the functionality of the card index – to the small rate of 
references in the available notes. Within the card index, they contradict what ought to 
be the very raison d’être of their networking principle by being relatively isolated: the 
few references that are made are also overwhelmingly circular, so that original new 
perspectives are seldom found in the card index. And the few references that do venture 
outside the theme’s traditional grounds end up referring do discussions that are then 
taken no further in the card index, such as on the evolution of politics and the law as 
cases where a general theory of evolution is applied. Correspondingly, no internal 
network of references could be set in motion with regard to the issue of the constitution 
and the card index could also not act as a generator of surprise links, in accordance with 
the general principle sketched out by Luhmann. This makes it clear that there are not 
only opportunities intrinsic to the principle of reference, but also risks, as Luhmann 
pointed out himself: “Every note is just an element that only achieves quality from the 
network of references and cross-references in the system. A note that is not linked in to 
this network gets lost in the card index: the card index forgets it. Its rediscovery is a 
matter of chance and also of the fortuitous circumstance that it will be rediscovered at a 
moment when the occurrence happens to mean something” (1981, 225). 
                                                        
24 Luhmann also tells us that this was the procedure he used increasingly during a late phase of the theory 
in an interview he gave in 1997: “I now have an alternative [to the card index], what you might call half-
finished book manuscripts, which are stored in boxes under my desk (…). When I now discover anything 
interesting about ‘sovereignty’, I can put it directly into the manuscript, where ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’ 
are dealt with.” (Hagen/Luhmann 2004, 107) What he does not say is that was accompanied by a 
fundamental change in his way of producing theories and texts.  
It would be exaggerated to argue that the notes about the constitution were forgotten 
in the card index, but no critical mass of observations, of the kind that could have 
triggered a process of new combinations of notes, ever came about, with the result that 
the card index was unable to act as a productive second memory for the issue of 
constitutionalism. In the case of the newer definition of the constitution, this led to the 
situation that Luhmann’s theoretical work no longer took place in the card index, but 
only in his publications themselves, as can easily be discerned, for example, by 
comparing how the two monographs on the law and on politics (published in 1993 and 
2000 respectively, but developed in close succession) handled the issue of the state and 
the constitution: they both illustrate his theory as work in progress, a state of affairs that 
in other fields tended to be recorded in the card index itself. In this respect, the card 
index was certainly not Luhmann’s favourite tool of thought for the issue of the 
constitution: at best, it could be a source of keywords. 
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